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I. INTRODUCTION 
In my book Proving the Unprovable, I discussed at length the con-
siderations that might govern the admissibility of expert psychiatric 
and psychological testimony in criminal and quasi-criminal cases.1  
This evidence law symposium gives me the opportunity to elaborate 
on one particular thesis of that book—that the definition of expertise 
in the criminal justice system, derived in the federal courts and in 
most states from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Co.,2 should 
vary depending on whether the issue involved is past mental state or 
past conduct.  I will also briefly discuss whether that proposition 
should be limited to expert testimony introduced by defendants in 
criminal trials, or whether instead it should be expanded to use of 
experts by the prosecution and by civil litigants. 
Of course, assessing the admissibility of expert testimony involves 
more than the reliability inquiry associated with Daubert.  Such evi-
dence must also be material (logically related to the substantive issue 
in question), helpful (in the sense of incrementally improving the 
factfinder’s understanding of the issue), and not substantially likely to 
be prejudicial or misleading (because, for instance, the evidence is 
more likely to lead the factfinder to consider immaterial issues).3  In 
the following discussion I generally ignore these other admissibility 
criteria and focus on the reliability factor addressed in Daubert (or 
what I have called the probative value inquiry), as it applies to expert 
testimony on past mental states and past acts. 
 ∗ Stephen C. O’Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of 
Law.  The author would like to thank Michael Risinger for organizing the panel at 
the 2008 American Association of Law Schools Meeting that prompted this Article 
and a number of individuals in the panel audience who challenged the assertions 
herein and triggered some significant fine-tuning of the arguments. 
 1 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE:  THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE 
AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS (2006). 
 2 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 3 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 15. 
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My conclusion is that, while expert psychological testimony 
about past acts ought to be based on scientifically verifiable asser-
tions, expert psychological testimony about subjective mental states 
relevant to criminal responsibility need not meet the same threshold.  
This stance emanates from the interplay between what I call the 
“right to voice” and a necessity rationale. The right to voice derives 
from the Constitution, which can be read to give criminal defendants 
a break whenever they want to present expert testimony.  But respect 
for Daubert and scientific epistemology counsels that this bow to the 
defense should occur only when a scientific approach is not possible.  
Such an approach is futile with respect to opinion testimony about 
past mental state, so a relaxed evidentiary standard should govern 
there.  However, when, as with past act testimony, the necessity argu-
ment is weak, Daubert should apply with full force. 
II. MEASURING THE PROBATIVE  
VALUE OF EXPERTISE IN CRIMINAL CASES 
To get us started, consider these six cases: 
•     Clark v. Arizona:4 The defendant presented psychiatric evi-
dence suggesting that he thought the police officer he killed 
was an alien, evidence designed to show not only that he was 
insane at the time of the killing but also that he lacked the 
mens rea for his charge, which required proof that he inten-
tionally or knowingly killed a police officer. 
•     United States v. Bright:5 The defendant, charged with possessing 
stolen mail (specifically, mail with checks in it), proffered tes-
timony from a psychologist to the effect that she was a passive-
dependent personality and thus gullibly believed an acquaint-
ance of her boyfriend when he told her the stolen checks were 
made out to him. 
•     Jahnke v. State:6 Expert psychiatric testimony suggested that Jah-
nke, who killed his father when the father came home from 
dinner with his wife, felt that his sister, his mother, and he had 
no other means of escaping long-term, relentless beating and 
mistreatment by the father. 
•     Waine v. State:7 The expert psychiatrist testified that the defen-
dant was a passive person and that the two homicides with 
which he was charged “would be totally out of character.” 
 4 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2716–18 (2006). 
 5 517 F.2d 584, 585–86 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 6 682 P.2d 991, 995–96 (Wyo. 1984). 
 7 377 A.2d 509, 521–23 (Md. 1977). 
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•     People v. Stoll:8 Testimony based on psychological testing as-
serted that the defendant, charged with molestation of 
younger boys, showed no indication of sexual deviance and 
only a low indication of antisocial or aggressive behavior, and 
thus was unlikely to have been involved in the sex offenses with 
which he was charged. 
•     People v. McCoy:9 Based on a psychological interview, a prosecu-
tion expert in a sexual abuse case testified that the alleged vic-
tim met the criteria for child sexual abuse syndrome and thus 
had been sexually abused. 
 In Clark, the state court excluded the testimony to the extent it 
was meant to negate mens rea, a decision the Supreme Court of the 
United States upheld, against a constitutional challenge, on the 
ground that states may bar expert testimony likely to be speculative 
and misleading.  In Bright, where the testimony was also directed at 
mens rea, and Jahnke, where the testimony was proffered to support a 
self-defense claim, the courts likewise excluded the expert testimony, 
for similar reasons.  In Waine, Stoll, and McCoy, in contrast, the state 
courts admitted the testimony over objections that it was speculative 
and misleading.  So, in Waine and Stoll expert opinion evidence was 
admitted to suggest the defendant did not commit the crime, while in 
McCoy it was admitted to prove that a crime had occurred (with other 
evidence suggesting that the defendant committed it).10
As I hope to demonstrate in this Article, all six of these cases 
were wrongly decided.  In Proving the Unprovable, I pushed the idea 
that Daubert’s stipulation that expert testimony be subject to some 
sort of scientific verification process should be interpreted differently 
depending on the context.  More specifically, I contended that while 
behavioral science testimony focused on whether the defendant 
committed a criminal act should be subject to the usual inquiries 
about the scientific methodology underlying the testimony, clinical 
testimony about subjectively-defined mental state doctrines such as 
insanity, diminished responsibility, or self-defense in battered women 
and battered child cases need only satisfy a beefed-up version of the 
well-known general acceptance test (a test defined further below).11  
These prescriptions would mean that the evidence presented in 
Waine, Stoll, and McCoy probably should have been excluded and that 
 8 783 P.2d 698, 707–15 (Cal. 1989). 
 9 400 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 10 See supra notes 4–9. 
 11 SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 43–46. 
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the evidence in Clark, Bright, and Jahnke probably should have been 
admitted. 
A. Why Past Mental State Is Different 
This proposed differentiation between past mental state and past 
act opinion testimony is based on a necessity rationale born of epis-
temological considerations.  Most expert testimony should have to 
meet Daubert’s demand for verification.  But we should be willing to 
contemplate a relaxed evidentiary threshold for opinion testimony 
about mental states that determine criminal culpability because we 
simply cannot ascertain what they are, at least in the same rigorous 
way we can use scientific methods to figure out whether a person 
committed a particular act. 
This epistemological difficulty exists for a number of reasons.  
First, as I pointed out in Proving the Unprovable, we can only know past 
mental states “through acts of interpretation that inevitably differ de-
pending on a host of factors, including the identity of the observer 
and the time at which the mental state is observed.”12  Perpetrators 
like Clark, Bright, and Jahnke may not be able to access their (often 
jumbled) thoughts and beliefs even at the time of the criminal act, 
much less weeks or months later.  Thus, even when honest, they are 
more likely to give a narrative account than a precise, uncolored de-
scription of their motivations when queried by researchers, mental 
health professionals and legal factfinders.  And these later interlocu-
tors will add still another interpretive gloss to the analysis of the de-
fendant’s past mental state, based on stereotypes, biases, analogies 
and personal experiences that are likely to be different from the de-
fendant’s.  As Andrew Taslitz points out, “[w]hen jurors name a men-
tal state as ‘premeditation,’ ‘heat of passion,’ or a ‘belief in the immi-
nent need to use deadly force in self-defense,’ they are crafting an 
interpretation that partly embodies their own assumptions, attitudes 
and beliefs.”13  In short, there is no ground truth about these types of 
past mental states.  The well-known Rashomon effect, named after 
the Akira Kurosawa film in which a crime witnessed by four individu-
als is described in four mutually contradictory ways, illustrates the 
point nicely.14
 12 Id. at 43 (citing Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence: 
Foundations, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 26 (1998)). 
 13 Taslitz, supra note 12, at 26. 
 14 For an interesting analysis of the epistemological implications of the Rasho-
mon effect, see Wendy D. Roth & Jal D. Mehta, The Rashomon Effect: Combining Positiv-
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Second, even if past mental states can be said to exist in some 
objective sense, “science will often not be up to the task of measuring 
them.”15  The reason is that the questions the criminal law asks about 
past mental state—does an offender claiming insanity “lack substan-
tial appreciation of the wrongfulness of his actions” or feel “com-
pelled”?;16 to what extent is a person like Clark or Bright misperceiv-
ing or oblivious to obvious fact?;17 how strongly does someone like 
Jahnke believe that harm to himself or his family is “imminent” and 
that violence is the only way to prevent it?18—are very difficult to an-
swer in a quantifiable way.  As I put it in Proving the Unprovable, “even 
if research relevant to past mental state can be characterized as sci-
ence, it is science that is so likely to be tainted by methodological 
flaws that, in effect, it is no different from interpretation and storytel-
ling.”19
Third, even if we could somehow objectively verify and measure 
past mental states, research designed to study them is often either 
impossible to conduct or very likely to produce irrelevant results.  
Experiments designed to recreate situations analogous to criminal 
events are ethically dubious for obvious reasons.  And natural world 
observation that does manage to acquire accurate information about 
mental states will often be legally immaterial.  Consider, for instance, 
a typical study, which found that twenty-two percent of those people 
with a serious mental illness who commit violence do so in a “gratui-
tous” manner, while only fourteen percent of defendants who are not 
so afflicted commit violence that can be labeled gratuitous.20  Even if 
we can be assured that the measurement of gratuitousness is reliable 
ist and Interpretivist Approaches in the Analysis of Contested Events, 31 SOC. METHODS & 
RES. 131 (2002). 
 15 SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 44. 
 16 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962) (excusing a person whose “mental 
disease or defect” resulted, at the time of the offense, in a lack of “substantial capac-
ity to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or conform his con-
duct to the requirements of the law”). 
 17 For many crimes, the mens rea is knowledge or recklessness, which requires an 
awareness of the result and circumstances of the crime.  See MODEL PENAL CODE  
§ 2.02(2)–(3) (1962). 
 18 The more subjective definitions of self-defense require proof that the actor be-
lieved the crime was necessary to prevent harm.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 
(1962).  In many states, imperfect self-defense or “extreme mental or emotional dis-
turbance” can reduce the charge from murder to manslaughter.  See MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 210.3(1)(b). 
 19 SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 46. 
 20 Ellen Hochstedler Steury & Michelle Choinski, “Normal” Crimes and Mental Dis-
order:  A Two-Group Comparison of Deadly and Dangerous Felonies, 18 INT’L J.L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 183, 197 (1995). 
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and that gratuitousness mitigates criminal culpability (both big as-
sumptions), the assertion that a defendant with serious mental illness 
is one and a half times more likely to commit gratuitous violence is 
very likely to lack what Daubert called “fit” because of the small base 
rates involved and the small difference between the ill and non-ill 
groups.21  Summing all of this up in social science terms, identifying 
the correlates of insanity, diminished responsibility, and other defen-
sive mental state conditions in a scientific fashion is very difficult be-
cause the dependent variables (insanity, diminished responsibility, 
fear of imminent harm) are so hard to discern, measure, and gener-
ate in sufficient numbers to produce statistically significant results.   
In contrast, research regarding conduct—on the behavioral ten-
dencies of killers and molesters and the psychological correlates of 
abuse that might be relevant in Waine, Stoll, and McCoy—is based on 
dependent variables (killings, molestation and abuse) that are objec-
tively observable and “measurable” and that can be found in signifi-
cant quantities in the natural world.  The social scientist operating in 
this context is trying to answer a much less amorphous question: did 
the defendant engage in conduct that caused a particular result? 
Consider Waine specifically.  The goal of research relevant to the tes-
timony in that case would be to examine the base rate for homicidal 
violence by people who are passive in the same sense Waine was pas-
sive and compare it to the base rate of other types of individuals.  The 
dependent variable in this research (homicide and similarly violent 
acts) is much easier to discern than the dependent variable in past 
mental state research.   
Of course, this research also involves an independent variable 
(passivity) which will probably be more of a chore to assess.  But it is 
still easier to evaluate than a past mental state such as appreciation of 
wrongfulness, intent, or gratuitousness, for two reasons.  First, the 
passivity at issue in Waine (and the “aggressiveness” at issue in Stoll 
and the correlates of abuse that were the focus in McCoy) can be 
measured in the here and now; no reconstruction of the past, essen-
tial in evaluating past mental state, is necessary.22  Second, passivity is 
a trait, not an event.  Gauging one’s character or arriving at a diagno-
sis is not easy, but it is easier than getting an accurate snapshot of how 
 21 509 U.S. at 591 (“‘Fit’ is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one pur-
pose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.”). 
 22 See, e.g., Regina Schuller & Patricia A. Hastings, Battered Child Syndrome, in 2 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 298–300 
(David Faigman et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE] (de-
scribing methodology of research on, inter alia, correlates of child abuse). 
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the person was feeling and thinking at a particular point in time in 
the past.  As discussed in more detail below, for instance, we possess 
pretty good tools for deducing whether a person suffers from psycho-
sis; determining whether and how that psychosis impaired one’s abil-
ity to appreciate the consequences of one’s actions at the time of a 
crime is an entirely different matter. 
Other types of social science research about criminal conduct 
are even less onerous to carry out, again because of the solidity of the 
dependent variable and the relative accessibility of the independent 
variables.  Behavioral scientists attempting to figure out the correlates 
of good and bad eyewitness identification can create situations in 
which the perpetrator is known and witnessing conditions varied,23 
and those who study the risk posed by criminals can track the careers 
of multiple offenders.24  Thus, not surprisingly, research on these 
types of issues is much more robust than empirical work about past 
mental states, which, as the preeminent forensic researcher Thomas 
Grisso notes, has long been characterized by “meager advances.”25
B. Normative Considerations:  Necessity and Voice 
Assuming this scientific dichotomy between past mental states 
and acts exists, what are the implications for evidence law?  Because 
the basis of expert testimony about criminal acts of the type pre-
sented in Waine, Stoll, and McCoy is susceptible to typical scientific 
testing, it should have to pass the standard Daubert test.  Since in none 
of these cases was good relevant data produced (at least as far as one 
can glean from the appellate opinions), the testimony should have 
been inadmissible under Daubert. 
But a different conclusion should be reached with respect to the 
opinion testimony presented in Clark, Bright, and Jahnke, because 
though it too was suspect, a “scientific” opinion was not possible in 
those cases.  Of course, even under a rigid interpretation of Daubert, 
behavioral observations can be described.  Thus, the defense expert 
in Clark wanting to bolster Clark’s claim of mental illness at the time 
of the offense could report the fact that Clark claimed he turned his 
car radio up—the act that attracted the attention of the cop who was 
 23 See, e.g., Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identifications, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE, supra note 22, at 481–85 (describing methodology of eyewitness identifica-
tion research). 
 24 John Monahan, Predictions of Violence, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra 
note 22, at 104–06 (discussing methodology of research about risk of violence). 
 25 Thomas Grisso, Pretrial Clinical Evaluations in Criminal Cases:  Past Trends and 
Future Directions, 23 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 90, 97–98 (1996). 
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his eventual victim—to drown out his “voices.”  The expert could also 
describe Clark’s claim that he thought the officer was an alien.  But a 
robust interpretation of Daubert might not permit the expert to state 
further that people with mental illness often use music to deal with 
auditory hallucinations and that visual hallucinations about aliens are 
common among such people, unless the expert could produce solid 
data supporting his assertions (which would be hard to do).26  And it 
would certainly not permit the expert to opine that Clark probably 
felt justified and perhaps compelled in shooting what he perceived to 
be a threatening figure.  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, 
although not purporting to apply Daubert, held that such testimony 
can be excluded on the ground that it is speculative and potentially 
misleading, at least with respect to the mens rea issue.27  Similarly, the 
expert in Bright would not be able to talk about the likelihood that 
Bright’s gullibility affected her decision to accept the stolen checks 
because of the lack of research on co-dependency and criminal acts.  
And, while there is ample empirical research on the effects of familial 
battering on a person’s perceptions of her or his options,28 many who 
are enamored of Daubert do not believe the research is good enough 
to pass that case’s threshold,29 so the analogous expert testimony in 
Jahnke would probably be excluded as well. 
This necessity rationale is likely to be unpersuasive, however, to 
those who believe that testimony that isn’t up to snuff should never be 
admitted; on this view, the fact that the testimony can’t possibly make 
 26 Although any veteran mental health professional can recount patients who 
“treat” their voices with music and who experience alien delusions, no research veri-
fies the prevalence of such phenomena.  E-mail from Paul Appelbaum, M.D., Eliza-
beth K. Dollard Professor of Psychiatry, Medicine and Law Director, Department of 
Psychiatry, Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons Department of 
Medicine, to author (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author) (stating that while he has 
no knowledge of research on either issue, such phenomena are clearly “in the realm 
of common wisdom” among mental health professionals). 
 27 Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2734 (2006) (referring to “the potential of 
mental-disease evidence to mislead jurors . . . through the power of this kind of evi-
dence to suggest that a defendant suffering from a recognized mental disease lacks 
cognitive, moral, volitional, or other capacity, when that may not be a sound conclu-
sion at all”). 
 28 See generally Regina Schuller & Sara Rzepa, Battered Woman Syndrome, in 2 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 22, at 236–54 (describing a number of theo-
ries, usually backed up by at least some research, as to why battered women feel 
bonded to the batterer or do not leave the relationship). 
 29 David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of 
Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 114 (1997) (“The syndrome, first proposed in the 1970’s 
[sic] and based on the clinical observations of a single researcher, has yet to be cor-
roborated by serious and rigorous empirical work.”). 
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the grade is simply too bad.30 In Proving the Unprovable, I argued 
against this tough stance toward past mental state opinion evidence 
on several grounds, all ultimately predicated on the assumption that 
defendants, who are much more likely than the state to benefit from 
relaxation of Daubert in connection with this type of testimony, have a 
constitutionally-based right to voice—a right to tell their story in the 
most effective way possible.  Depriving a defendant of a qualified ex-
pert on past mental state issues trenches on the right to testify, which 
stems from the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause, and 
on the Sixth Amendment rights to confront accusers, present evi-
dence, and have one’s charges considered by a (fully informed) 
jury.31  Indeed, the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Rock v. Ar-
kansas,32 the case that established the right to testify, went so far as to 
state that testimony from the defendant can be excluded only when it 
“is always so untrustworthy and so immune to the traditional means 
of evaluating credibility that it should disable a defendant from pre-
senting her version of the events for which she is on trial.”33  Others 
have argued that the compulsory process clause incorporates a fair 
process rationale that entitles the defendant to present any evidence 
that is material to her case,34 and that the right to jury trial would be 
undermined if lay people are not given the opportunity to consider 
whether the defendant’s story, however fantastic on the surface, may 
nonetheless ultimately be plausible.35
Without an expert providing an opinion on past mental state, 
evidence about it will usually consist primarily of a description of 
mental condition, either by the defendant or through the expert, 
shorn of educated guesses about causal factors, garbled because of 
impaired mental condition or simple inarticulateness, and dis-
counted by jurors and judges who, lacking expert counterfactuals, are 
 30 Another response is to change the substantive law, so that mens rea and the 
affirmative defenses are defined entirely objectively.  See, e.g., Bruce Ledewitz, Mr. 
Carroll’s Mental State and What is Meant by Intent, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71, 100–07 
(2001) (arguing that, given the “evanescence” and unfalsifiability of intentions, the 
criminal law should readopt the presumption that a person intends the natural and 
probable consequences of his actions).  A response to that response is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 31 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 53–55, 139. 
 32 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment’s Lost Clause:  Unearthing Compulsory Proc-
ess, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1316–51. 
 35 Katherine Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to Trial by Jury and the Requirement of 
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt:  A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom about Excluding 
Defense Evidence, 86 GEO. L.J. 621, 636–39 (1998). 
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more likely to rely on misconceived notions of mental aberration and 
to assume sanity and intent from the defendant’s actions.  With an 
expert, defendants can present a more coherent and credible picture 
of what they were thinking and feeling at the time of the offense—a 
picture which, while inevitably speculative, is not clearly wrong, ex-
cept in those rare instances (addressed below) when defendants suc-
cessfully malinger.  Furthermore, contrary to the apparent assump-
tion of some commentators and courts, judges and juries are unlikely 
to be hoodwinked by such testimony, about which they are naturally 
skeptical and which normally must be very persuasive to overcome lay 
preconceptions about mental functioning.36  And even if the fact 
finder does get it wrong, the practical impact of an erroneous verdict 
is usually not dire:  “successful” defendants will end up in a mental 
hospital if they pleaded insanity, and in prison on reduced charges if 
they pleaded lack of specific intent or argued that a syndrome of 
some sort diminished their responsibility.37  This latter fact, by the 
way, is an additional pragmatic distinction between past mental state 
testimony and past act testimony—besides the aforementioned dif-
ferences in the ease of producing useable research—arguing in favor 
of maintaining Daubert as the threshold for past act testimony, which, 
if successfully deployed by the defendant, results in outright acquittal. 
C. A Proposed Evidentiary Standard 
The necessity and voice rationales only take us so far, however.  
While they justify a relaxed test for past mental state testimony, they 
probably do not sanction the porous standard that many courts still 
adhere to despite fifteen years of Daubert.  Except when truly novel 
“syndrome” evidence is presented, or when, as in Clark, Bright, and 
 36 Claims of diminished responsibility are rarely successful.  See, e.g., Stuart M. Kir-
schner & Gary M. Galperin, The Defense of Extreme Emotional Disturbance in New York 
Country:  Pleas and Outcomes, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 47, 49 (2002) (contested diminished 
responsibility claims failed in ten of eleven jury trials and in all five cases in which a 
bench trial was held).  Additionally, significant research debunks the notion that ju-
ries are easily swayed by defense experts.  See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Mak-
ing:  45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
622, 689 (2001) (“It is clear that expert testimony is not accepted in a mindless fash-
ion by gullible jurors awed by flashy credentials.”); see also SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 
86. 
 37 Even when battered woman and battered child syndrome evidence is intro-
duced in an effort to gain acquittal on self-defense grounds, the usual result is con-
viction on manslaughter charges.  See Leigh Goodmark, The Punishment of Dixie 
Shanahan: Is There Justice for Battered Women Who Kill?, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 269, 279 
(2007) (“Studies consistently find that large percentages of the women incarcerated 
for murder or manslaughter are in prison because they killed intimate partners who 
had abused them.”). 
SLOBOGIN_FINAL 6/6/2008  12:41:08 PM 
2008] EXPERTS, MENTAL STATES, AND ACTS 1019 
 
Jahnke, it is directed at defenses other than insanity, the courts tend to 
let a psychiatric expert say anything.38  Although the language in Rock 
v. Arkansas might seem to support this approach, Rock involved con-
spicuously self-serving fact testimony by the defendant that would be 
viewed with skepticism by any jury, not supposedly objective and 
more influential opinion testimony by an expert.  A more demanding 
standard should be required in the latter context. 
In Proving the Unprovable, I proposed the “generally accepted con-
tent validity” test, which consists of two parts, general acceptance and 
content validity.39  The general acceptance concept is well known to 
lawyers because it comes from the 1923 decision in Frye v. United 
States,40 which dominated analysis of expert testimony admissibility 
until Daubert was decided in 1993.  Expert testimony passes the Frye 
test if it is based on theories and methodology accepted by most or 
many practitioners in the relevant field.41  Content validity is a con-
cept well-known to social scientists.  It is to be distinguished from cri-
terion validity and construct validity, both of which are also means of 
measuring accuracy.  Criterion validity requires having objective cri-
teria against which to measure a finding, and construct validity re-
quires identifying a valid outcome measure of constructs analogous to 
the construct being studied so that comparisons can be made.42  Be-
cause, for the reasons suggested above, good criteria and comparable 
outcomes are not readily available for past mental state findings, con-
tent validity is probably the best we can do for now in this setting.  
Content validity asks whether the content of an assessment looks like it 
addresses the relevant issues.43
So, in combination, “generally accepted” “content validity” re-
quires that expert testimony assess factors that knowledgeable and 
experienced experts in the field consider important in the type of 
case at issue.  In practical effect, it would require that experts evaluat-
ing mental state at the time of the offense use standardized interview 
protocols similar to those developed in related evaluation settings.44  
 38 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 27. 
 39 Id. at 60–62. 
 40 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 41 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United 
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1228–32 (1980). 
 42 NOREEN L. CHANNELS, SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODS IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 140–42 
(1985). 
 43 Id. 
 44 See, e.g., GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS:  A 
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 149–54 (3d ed. 2007) 
(describing standardized instruments for evaluating competency to stand trial); id. at 
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Here is an excerpt from Proving the Unprovable providing an example 
of how the generally accepted content validity test would be imple-
mented and how it could impose limits on past mental state testi-
mony sufficient to satisfy a loose interpretation of Daubert’s verifica-
tion requirement: 
     Assume . . . that a defendant charged with murder is asserting 
an insanity defense and a psychologist is ordered to evaluate his 
mental state at the time of the offense.  The psychologist carries 
out a thorough evaluation and concludes that the defendant was 
suffering from posttraumatic stress syndrome [(PTSD)] as a result 
of fighting in the Iraq war. . . . [Such a conclusion might be 
based, in part, upon] statistical information about, for instance, 
the prevalence of PTSD among war veterans[.  B]ut, for reasons 
[given above], this type of data will seldom be useful in making 
individualized culpability determinations, except to the extent it 
may bolster a claim that the defendant had PTSD.  The more im-
portant information will be the sources consulted, the questions 
asked, the instruments and psychological tests used (e.g., the SIRS 
[for Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms], a well-
constructed instrument designed to detect malingering), and the 
reasoning that led to the evaluator’s conclusions. 
     This evaluation report could provide several lessons for future 
evaluators.  First, of course, it would provide an illustration of how 
the [American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual’s] PTSD criteria apply in a criminal case.  Second, it may 
identify several post-trauma behaviors that are indicative of peo-
ple with PTSD who commit crime.  Third, it could provide a list of 
potential sources of information—research-based and anecdata—
in such cases.  Fourth, it should indicate what kinds of psycho-
logical tests, if any, are relevant in such an investigation.  Ideally it 
would also identify the clinical factors the legal fact finder consid-
ered relevant to its finding of insanity . . . . Over time, a consensus 
might develop as to how PTSD-based insanity claims should be as-
sessed, aided perhaps by researchers with access to the database 
[of like reports] who could test interrater reliability . . . . [O]ne or 
more generally accepted evaluation formats for this type of case 
might emerge. 
     The role of such a format in determining admissibility would 
be straightforward.  If future evaluators faced with potential PTSD 
309–14 (describing risk assessment tools).  The general acceptance threshold would 
also exclude testimony from individuals who are merely good “story-tellers.”  Cf. 
David Faigman, To Have and Have Not:  Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as 
Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1013, 1085–86 (1989) (arguing there is no dis-
tinction between suppositional testimony from mental health professionals and 
“Dostoevskean psychologist[s]”). 
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cases failed to consider the various clinical factors it incorpo-
rates—the diagnostic criteria, their forensic implications, sources 
of information, testing information—the admissibility of their 
opinion would be called in doubt, depending on the degree of 
failure and whether reasonable alternatives were used.  Ulti-
mately, a clinician who wanted to testify about PTSD-induced in-
sanity but who paid little heed to various factors that case law (in 
both the legal and [clinical] sense of that term) has identified as 
significant to that inquiry would be prohibited from taking the 
stand.  In this sense, at least, Daubert’s demand for verification 
that an expert’s opinion be reliable can be implemented in the 
culpability context.45
The battered woman scenario provides another example of how 
the concept of generally accepted content validity might work.  Re-
search suggests that factors that could be present when a battered 
woman kills her batterer include subjective psychological variables 
(learned helplessness, traumatic bonding, symptoms of posttraumatic 
stress disorder), relatively objective behavioral variables (substance 
abuse by the batterer, threats to children as well as the woman, more 
frequent and severe injuries due to battering, childhood abuse of the 
woman) and external variables (the availability of services to help bat-
tered women).46  Under the proposed test, an expert who did not col-
lect information about and consider these variables would be prohib-
ited from testifying due to a lack of content validity.  Conversely, 
scientific proof, complete with error rates, of the extent to which 
women who meet these conditions kill in fear would not be required.  
Whether fear was the motivating factor, how powerful the fear was, 
and whether it was generated by a perception that grave harm was 
otherwise inevitable are not “facts” susceptible to such proof. 
III. THE SEARCH FOR “SUBSTANTIVE ACCURACY” 
Some reviewers have found this approach to opinion testimony 
about past mental state plausible.47  In an article in this symposium 
issue, Edward Imwinkelried indicates that he is not necessarily op-
posed to it, but that he is concerned that the generally accepted con-
 45 SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 65–66. 
 46 See Shuller & Rzepa, supra note 28. 
 47 Robert L. Halon & Theodore Donaldson, Charting the Course Out of Admissibility 
Chaos, in CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY:  APA REVIEW OF BOOKS 1, 3–4 (2007) (“We fully 
endorse allowing defendants to decide whether mental health information and/or 
clinical opinion, reliable or not, will be introduced in their defense at culpability tri-
als.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Book Review: Proving the Unprovable, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2007, at 
70, 76 (stating that the book’s “arguments are persuasive and practical, and the law is 
likely to move in the direction he suggests over time”). 
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tent validity standard gives up too easily—in his words, it “abandon[s] 
the search for substantive accuracy.”48  Professor Imwinkelried then 
purports to illustrate why that search need not be futile by describing 
in detail the science of detecting malingering or, as behavioral scien-
tists call it, the science of gauging response styles.  That branch of 
mental health forensic work has matured appreciably in the past dec-
ade and, Professor Imwinkelried argues, shows that assessments of 
past mental states are not as immune to research-based efforts as I 
suggest. 
I agree with at least two aspects of Professor Imwinkelried’s arti-
cle.  First, we should never abandon the search for substantive accu-
racy.  As Professor Imwinkelried notes, at several points in Proving the 
Unprovable I state that scientifically reliable evidence ought to be pre-
sented when available.49  If a method for obtaining such evidence for 
particular types of past mental state is developed, it should find its 
way into the type of evaluation format I described above.  Perhaps the 
behavioral sciences will even advance to the point where we can fairly 
apply the same verification test we apply to other sorts of expert tes-
timony.  I doubt that will happen any time soon, but we obviously 
should not foreclose that possibility. 
Professor Imwinkelried is also correct that social scientists have 
done a remarkable job devising a number of reliable and valid in-
struments and techniques for detecting when a criminal defendant 
may be exaggerating, fabricating, or denying certain symptoms.  
While significant caveats about these advances must be made,50 they 
are clearly superior to seat-of-the-pants assessments of response style 
 48 Edward Imwinkelried, The Case Against Abandoning the Search for Substantive Ac-
curacy, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1031 (2008). 
 49 See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 59 (“In those few instances when scientifi-
cally reliable information material to [past mental state] is available, the expert 
should rely on it.”). 
 50 One review of the literature (in a book of which I am a co-author) states the 
caveats this way:  
First, because they do not provide information about why an examinee 
might be feigning symptoms, even the best measures of symptom exag-
geration/fabrication are not measures of malingering—a diagnosis that, 
according to the DSM-IV, indicates feigning for a specific purpose.  Sec-
ond, given the limitations of existing assessment approaches, examiners 
should be cautious in their descriptions of examinees’ response styles, 
and recognize the potential for error.  Third, examiners should not make 
the fundamental error of assuming that evidence of symptom exaggera-
tion indicates the absence of genuine impairment, since persons who ex-
aggerate and fabricate difficulties can still also have significant impair-
ment.  
MELTON ET AL., supra note 44, at 62. 
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at figuring out who among those claiming psychosis, depression, and 
other major impairments are actually suffering from those condi-
tions.  Thus, as the example in the previous section of this Article in-
dicates, instruments like the SIRS51 clearly should be part of every cli-
nician’s assessment package (and would be required under a 
generally accepted content validity test). 
Unfortunately, however, the ability to ascertain whether a person 
is fabricating mental disability is not very useful in most cases.  Popu-
lar imagination and fiction notwithstanding, most defendants who 
claim insanity or some other legal defense based on mental impair-
ment have a colorable claim of disorder, based on previous hospitali-
zations, trauma from battering, or other evidence of symptoms.52  At 
the same time, few of them are found insane or diminished in re-
sponsibility.  In Clark, for instance, the state did not contest that Clark 
suffered from a significant mental illness.  Rather, the assertion was 
that, despite his psychosis, Clark knew his victim was a police officer, 
intended to kill him, and knew it was wrong when he was doing it (all 
assertions that the factfinder in that case accepted).53  Similarly, in 
probably the most famous recent insanity case, the prosecution did 
not argue that Andrea Yates was fabricating her mental disorder, the 
evidence for which was substantial; rather, it contended that her 
thought process was not so confused that she was incapable of know-
ing how wrong it was to drown her five children in the bathtub (an 
assertion that prevailed in Yates’s first trial but not her second, which 
suggests how slippery these issues are).54  The same points can be 
made in connection with the Bright and Jahnke cases.55  The extent to 
which gullibility and fear, respectively, drove the defendant’s actions 
at the time of the offense were the key issues in those cases, not 
 51 See Richard Rogers et al., Faking Specific Disorders:  A Study of the Structured Inter-
view of Reported Symptoms (SIRS), 48 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 643, 643 (1992). 
 52 I can find no statistics directly on point, but it is clear that most individuals 
found insane are in fact suffering from psychosis.  See MELTON ET AL., supra note 44, 
at 234 tbl.8.1 (reporting results from six studies in four states showing between sixty-
eight percent and ninety-seven percent prevalence rate of psychosis among those 
found not guilty by reason of insanity). 
 53 Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2718 (2006) (“The judge noted that though 
Clark was indisputably afflicted with paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the shoot-
ing, the mental illness ‘did not . . . distort his perception of reality so severely that he 
did not know his actions were wrong.’”). 
 54 Phillip J. Resnick, The Andrea Yates Case: Insanity on Trial, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
147, 150–53 (2007). 
 55 See U.S. v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1975); Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 
(Wyo. 1984). 
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whether Bright was a dependent personality and Jahnke a battered 
child who suffered trauma as a result. 
Another way of making this point is to divide expert testimony 
about mental state into ascending levels of inference, as I did in Prov-
ing the Unprovable.56  The first level involves little or no inference, be-
cause it consists of a description of behavioral observations (e.g., the 
defendant talks to himself, thinks he is Napoleon, or hears voices 
from people who are not there).  The second level, which requires at 
least some degree of inference-drawing, is that the individual is ex-
periencing psychiatric symptoms (e.g., delusions and hallucinations, 
as opposed to, for instance, mumbling that is simply a nervous trait).  
The third level is diagnostic categorization (e.g., is he better labeled 
with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder?), which allows the ex-
pert to talk about characteristics—perhaps discovered through re-
search, perhaps known through experience—that a person like the 
defendant might have.  The fourth level is the extent to which the 
mental disorder, if there is one, impaired cognition or volition at the 
time of the offense.  The final level of inference involves reaching the 
ultimate legal issue (e.g., sane or insane).  I, among many others, do 
not think mental health professionals should address the ultimate le-
gal issue, for evidentiary and ethical reasons.57  I do think they should 
be permitted to address the other four levels of inference.  While bet-
ter symptom-assessment and response-style instruments and more 
precise diagnostic criteria have permitted fairly high reliability with 
respect to levels two and three, science is left behind when the expert 
addresses level four. 
IV. A BRIEF CASE STUDY 
In other writing, I have provided several examples of how level 
four expert testimony about past mental state can be helpful to 
criminal defendants.58  To bring home both the impact a strict inter-
pretation of Daubert would have and the relative unimportance of re-
sponse style instruments in many cases concerning criminal responsi-
bility, consider another example of expert testimony about past 
mental state, this time presented in a capital sentencing hearing, 
where the rules of evidence are sometimes held to (and should) ap-
ply.59  The defendant in this case was, on the face of it, an unsympa-
 56 SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 50. 
 57 See id. at 80–85. 
 58 See id. at 52 (providing a summary of cases). 
 59 See Thomas Regnier, Barefoot in Quicksand:  The Future of “Future Dangerousness” 
Predictions in Death Penalty Sentencing in the World of Daubert and Kumho, 37 AKRON L. 
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thetic individual.  The jury had convicted him for killing the young 
daughter of his girlfriend shortly after the girlfriend had rejected him 
while they were in a bar.  After this public humiliation, he stormed 
out of the building, saying to the woman “You will cry a river of tears”; 
he then drove home and locked himself in the couples’ bedroom.  
When the police forced open the door shortly thereafter, they found 
the defendant, as well as the girl lying in a pool of blood.60
The defense’s psychiatric evidence was meant to bolster the 
claim that the homicide was not what it appeared to be—a  revenge 
killing—but rather the result of  “extreme mental or emotional 
stress” stemming from, among other things, sexual abuse as a child 
and his subsequent relations with women.  After noting that the de-
fendant had been anally raped at age eleven and discussing some of 
the research showing that such sexual abuse can affect an individual’s 
“emotional instability and impulsivity” (level three inference in the 
hierarchy described above), the following dialogue took place be-
tween the defense attorney and the expert: 
Q.: What is the most violent type of rape that . . . can occur? 
A.: It is not well researched, but anecdotally what is usually as-
sumed to be true, because we do not have good research in this 
area, is that any type of penetration of a violent nature, whether it 
be anal penetration or oral sodomy, or vaginal rape, any type of 
significant penetration, with violence and aggression has a more 
determining effect than if the individual has not been pene-
trated. . . . 
Q.: Would it be your opinion within a reasonable degree of psy-
chiatric certainty that there’s a likelihood that some of these ef-
fects would be present [in the defendant]? 
A.: Well, I would think it’s a very, very high probability, and I 
would say 80 to 90 percent probability that what I described is pre-
sent.  I would say even higher than that. 
Prosecutor: I object to this judge. 
Judge: Overruled. 
A.: I would say, unquestionably, that he suffered traumatic effects 
from this sexual rape that had terrific effects on his personal-
ity . . . and will continue to affect him all life long. . . . And I would 
say it contributed greatly to his rage when he killed this little girl. 
Q.: Do you see a continuing trend throughout his life in terms of 
the remnants or the effects of this trauma? 
REV. 469, 504–06 (2004) (arguing for stricter evidentiary standards in capital sentenc-
ing cases). 
 60 E-mail from Edith Georgi, Public Defender, Miami, FL, to author (Dec. 7, 
2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Email from Georgi]. 
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A.: Well, I see it mainly in terms of his relationships with women, 
which I think really originates from his real damaged sense of 
masculinity subsequent to the rape where he ultimately failed to 
really satisfy his common law wife . . . because she ultimately be-
trayed him and was unfaithful with a brother-in-law and that un-
faithfulness only kind of certifies and confirms his own doubts 
about his masculinity. . . . Then when he finally meets [the 
mother of the victim] he really hopes will be the love of his life, 
he tries desperately to please her and placate her.  He does the 
laundry.  He does the cleaning.  He does the cooking.  He does 
everything that he imagines will satisfy her but in spite of his best 
effort he really is unable to satisfy her and she spurns him and 
displays interest in other men and once again, he feels terribly be-
trayed, which confirms his own sense of doubt about his own mas-
culinity and I think these factors contributed greatly to his over-
whelming rage at the night of the homicide.61
Note first that credibility was not an issue here.  The past sexual 
abuse, the relationship problems, and the defendant’s anger at the 
time of the offense (as distinct from the expert’s explanation of it) 
were all accepted by the prosecution.62  Response style measurement 
would have served no useful purpose.  Note next that most of this tes-
timony is not based on data (and indeed the expert candidly admits 
the absence of science on the issue).  Rather, it is a story about the 
psychodynamics of the defendant’s motivations at the time of the of-
fense—what Professor Bonnie and I have called “informed specula-
tion,”63 but speculation nonetheless—and thus inadmissible under a 
strict Daubert standard.  If it had been excluded, the jury might still 
have had the descriptions of the defendant’s abuse as a child, the re-
search indicating that abused people have emotional problems, and 
evidence about his bad relationships with women.  But nothing would 
have tied all of this information together and, more importantly, 
nothing would have shown how it might provide a (possibly mitigat-
ing) explanation for the offense.  In fact, the defendant was given a 
life sentence instead of the death penalty, a result the defense attor-
ney attributes to the expert testimony.64  Whether or not one agrees 
with the outcome, there is little doubt that, without the expert, the 
defendant’s story would have been much less ably told. 
 61 Transcript of Record, State v. Matute-Chirinos, at 71–72. (11th Jud. Cir., Dade 
County, Fla., May 6, 1997) (No. 94-18663).   
 62 Email from Georgi, supra note 60. 
 63 See Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Profes-
sionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427 
(1980). 
 64 Email from Georgi, supra note 60. 
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V. PAST MENTAL STATE EVIDENCE  
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION AND CIVIL LITIGANTS 
Looking at the issue from the perspective of whether an adver-
sarial system or some other procedural regime best serves justice, Mi-
chael Risinger has also (tentatively) concluded that proof standards 
should be dichotomized depending upon whether the testimony in-
volves potentially “normative”/“value” issues—under which he classi-
fies mental states—or “factual”/fact issues.65  As he puts it: 
When the practically live issues are either normative or magnitude 
judgment issues not like the simple binary fact of perpetration, 
then perhaps free-proof, free-for-all, highly contextualized, thick-
description sausage-making by partisan cooks is the most legiti-
mate way to approach the special competence of a jury.  But by 
the same token, when the actual triable issue in a criminal case is 
the simple binary issue of perpetration, or a similar pure-fact bi-
nary issue, then this is perhaps the least legitimate way to pro-
ceed.66
Restating these observations in a way that bolsters the stance taken in 
this Article, while jury decision making, partisan evidence presenta-
tion, and free-proof may be prone to lead to biased results on rela-
tively black-and-white whodunit questions, they are relatively well-
suited for dealing with amorphous mental state issues. 
Professor Risinger’s focus is on the proper procedures for ensur-
ing that factually innocent defendants are not convicted or sentenced 
to death.  But, in the course of concluding that proof of binary facts 
ought to be subject to special burdens, he appears willing to extend 
partisan free-proof flexibility to all litigants wanting to “contextualize” 
any of the “polyvalent” (mental state) aspects of the case, not just 
criminal defendants making assertions about subjective culpability at 
the time of the offense.67  When viewed through the prism of jury ver-
sus non-jury decision-making, that position may make sense.  But do 
the arguments identified in this Article about letting criminal defen-
dants off the Daubert hook when they want to present past mental 
state opinion testimony also apply to prosecutors and civil litigants 
who want to do the same, and to any party—criminal accused, prose-
 65 D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial 
and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281, 1290–95 (2004). 
 66 Id. at 1307. 
 67 Id. at 1294 (“Some state-of-mind judgments that we expect juries to make, such 
as negligence or insanity, carry a more or less explicit normative warrant.”); see D. 
Michael Risinger, A Functional Taxonomy of Expertise, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE, supra note 22, at 138–40 (discussing expertise on “normative” issues). 
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cutor, or civil litigant—who wants to introduce expert evidence about 
present mental state? 
With one major exception and perhaps one small one, my incli-
nation is to say no.  The defendant’s right to voice, stemming from a 
number of constitutional provisions, is stronger than that of other 
litigants.  Thus, criminal defendants have the best argument for a re-
laxed Daubert standard.  At the same time, even their strong right to 
voice should not permit criminal defendants to evade usual eviden-
tiary strictures when the necessity rationale is absent, as is the case not 
only with past act evidence but with present mental state evidence as 
well. 
The major exception to the view that parties other than criminal 
defendants should be forced to adhere to Daubert-heavy (as opposed 
to Daubert-lite) occurs when the prosecution wants to respond in kind 
to a defendant’s assertions about past mental state.  Adversarial bal-
ance, combined with the necessity rationale, should permit the gov-
ernment to present past mental state expertise once the defendant 
decides to do so.  Thus, the prosecution should be able to respond to 
speculative psychiatric testimony supporting insanity or mens rea with 
similarly speculative expert evidence. 
A different situation is presented, however, if the defendant 
makes assertions about his or her subjective culpability without relying 
on an expert.  In State v. Hickman,68 the prosecution’s expert in a rape 
case was allowed to testify that the defendant fit the profile of an “ag-
gressive rapist,” suggesting, contrary to the defendant’s assertion, that 
the intercourse was non-consensual.  Even if it were to pass Daubert, 
this expert testimony, which was evidence of propensity, should have 
been inadmissible under the character evidence rule.69  A defen-
dant’s assertion that intercourse was consensual is an assertion about 
his mental state at a particular time, not his personality, and thus 
does not open the character evidence door.70
 68 337 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Iowa 1983). 
 69 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (prohibiting prosecution presentation of evidence 
about the defendant’s bad character unless the defendant first introduces evidence 
of good character). 
 70 Unfortunately for the prosecution, this type of inadmissible character evidence 
is likely to be the only expert testimony available to it unless the defendant decides to 
use a mental health professional to support an insanity or diminished responsibility 
defense, at which point the defendant is usually thought to waive Fifth Amendment 
protection from an evaluation seeking rebuttal evidence, and the state can acquire 
specific information about the defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense.  
See Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 422–23 (1987) (noting that many United 
States courts of appeal have held that defendants may be required to submit to a 
state-ordered psychiatric evaluation after they assert an insanity defense). 
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Accordingly, prosecution-initiated expert testimony on past 
mental state should generally be permitted only when the defense 
uses an expert on the same issue. But a second exception might arise 
when the prosecution’s expert focuses on the victim rather than the 
defendant.  Consider, in this regard, expert opinion evidence about 
rape trauma syndrome, which is designed to rebut a rape defendant’s 
claim that the intercourse was consensual by providing evidence that 
the alleged victim experienced trauma around the time of the inter-
course (which, thus, must have been forced).71  The research basis for 
this past mental state claim is weak, so it does not meet the strict ver-
sion of Daubert.72  But it might still be admissible on necessity grounds 
(because it focuses on mental state at the time of the offense) and on 
voice grounds (given the new interest in victim’s rights73), and despite 
the character evidence rule (because it is being introduced to prove 
the past mental state of the victim, not of the defendant).74
 As to the relevance of all of this to civil cases, a preliminary ob-
servation is that most civil suits do not require normatively-tinged as-
sessments of subjective past mental states.  Negligence is an objective 
standard, and assessments of mental injury, while necessary in a wide 
range of civil litigation, usually do not require pinpoint analysis of 
previous mental states.75  But when past mental state does become an 
issue—in wills contests when the testator is dead or when the motiva-
tion of the alleged perpetrator in sexual harassment or punitive dam-
age cases becomes pertinent—necessity and voice arguments could 
be made here as well, although the different stakes involved, the ab-
sence of a constitutional thumb on the scale in favor of one of the 
 71 See, e.g., State v. McCoy, 366 S.E.2d 731, 736–37 (W. Va. 1988). 
 72 Patricia A. Frazier, Rape Trauma Syndrome:  Legal Issues, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE, supra note 22, at 428 (“much of what passes as expert testimony [about 
rape trauma syndrome] today is not supported in the research literature”). 
 73 See generally Douglas E. Beloof & Paul Cassell, The Crime Victim’s Right to Attend 
the Trial:  The Reascendant National Consenus, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 481 (2005).  At 
most, however, victims may have a right under statutory or state constitutional law to 
attend trial, not to testify, a fact which diminishes the voice argument.  Id. at 546. 
 74 A further consideration in this setting is that jurors may well be skeptical of 
women who claim rape when there is no physical evidence of forcible intercourse, 
the usual scenario in which rape trauma evidence is presented.  See Toni Massaro, 
Experts, Psychology, Credibility and Rape:  The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and its Implica-
tions for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395, 443–44 (1985) (arguing 
that evidence of rape trauma syndrome should be admissible in part to overcome 
preconceptions of jurors about rape). 
 75 See MELTON ET AL., supra note 44, at 414 (“[M]ental injury evaluation . . . . 
[c]onsider[s] the examinee’s functioning prior to the alleged harm (a retrospective 
assessment), at the time of the evaluation (a current-state assessment), and in the fu-
ture (a prospective assessment).”). 
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parties, and a host of other factors make the analysis much more 
complicated. 
I will not undertake that analysis here, but rather merely empha-
size that the best case for permitting suspect opinion testimony about 
past mental states rests with criminal defendants.  They have the most 
to lose when they are prevented from telling their stories, and are the 
group of litigants most likely to be disbelieved when they tell their 
stories unaided by experts.  In short, they are the litigants most in 
need of expert speculation about past mental states.  Assuming it is 
material and possesses the minimal degree of probative value con-
templated by the generally accepted content validity test, such specu-
lation should be permitted, even if we are sure that we are not sure 
about its scientific bona fides. 
